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A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Impact of the
Legislative Protection of Technological Protection Measures
on Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression
Graham Reynolds†

Introduction

can be used to challenge provisions in the Copyright Act.
5 Part IV will evaluate whether amendments to the Copyright Act granting protection to TPMs are consistent
with the freedom of expression guarantee (s. 2(b)) in the
Charter. Part V will investigate the treaty implications of
protecting a right to access works for fair dealing purposes within legislation granting protection to TPMs.
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A

single click of a mouse from a personal computer
can create a perfect copy of a digital work. In a
fraction of a second, this work can be disseminated
throughout global networks to countless recipients. With
each click, individuals have the opportunity to broadcast
their ideas and expressions throughout the interconnected digital world; each click can also be a lost sale for
a copyright owner. In response to the concerns of copyright owners regarding the threat of digital technologies
to their exclusive rights, some governments have granted
legislative protection to technological protection mechanisms (TPMs). TPMs act as a virtual lock on digital works,
preventing unauthorized access and giving copyright
owners an unprecedented degree of control over digital
content. 1 On 20 June, 2005, the Canadian government
tabled Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act. 2
Among other copyright reforms, Bill C-60 proposes legislative protection for TPMs.

This paper concludes that should the Canadian government amend the Copyright Act to provide legislative
protection for TPMs, it must create a corresponding right
for users to access copyright-protected expression for fair
dealing purposes. Otherwise, the provisions may not survive Charter scrutiny. Although this paper will discuss
this topic with reference to Canada, materials will be
used from other jurisdictions in building this discussion.
As well, the general argument in this paper may be
helpful in addressing the interplay between copyright,
fair dealing, and freedom of expression rights in other
jurisdictions.

TPMs preclude unauthorized uses of copyright-protected works. Not all unauthorized uses, however, are
infringing. Copyright law’s fair dealing defence provides
that in certain circumstances, the unauthorized use of
another’s copyright-protected expression will not constitute copyright infringement. However, as ‘‘state of the art
TPMs are still unable to distinguish between infringing
and non-infringing uses’’, 3 TPMs have the effect of
restricting both infringing and non-infringing uses of
digital works. TPMs, by locking out all unauthorized
users, severely constrain the ability of users to exercise
their right to fair dealing.

Part I: Technological Protection
Measures
What is a TPM?

A

TPM is a ‘‘technological method intended to promote the authorized use of digital works’’. 6 It
accomplishes this by ‘‘controlling access to such works or
various uses of such works, including copying, distribution, performance, and display’’. 7 TPMs operate as ‘‘virtual fences’’, 8 giving copyright holders a ‘‘historically
unprecedented degree of control over access to and use
of digital content’’. 9 One example of a TPM in use is a
CD protected by copy control technology. The user is
allowed to play the CD on certain approved players (for
instance, in a freestanding CD player but not in a car).
The user is restricted, however, from making a copy of
the CD or transferring the songs from her CD to her
computer.

This paper will investigate whether legislation
granting protection to TPMs infringes the freedom of
expression (s. 2(b)) guarantee as contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 4 This paper will
proceed in five parts. Part I will discuss Bill C-60 and the
legislative protection of TPMs in Canada. Part II will
discuss the effect of TPMs on fair dealing. Part III will
analyze whether the freedom of expression guarantee
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The legislative protection of TPMs in
Canada
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In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) concluded two treaties meant to address a
wide array of digital copyright issues: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT ) 10 and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 11. Both treaties contain provisions requiring member countries to ‘‘provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective technological [protection] measures’’ (TPMs) used by authors, performers,
or producers of phonograms in connection with the
exercise of their rights under these treaties or the Berne
Convention, and ‘‘that restrict acts which are not authorized by the authors or permitted by law’’. 12
In 1997, the Government of Canada signed both
the WCT and WPPT. As of May 2006, however, Canada
has not ratified either treaty. In May 2004, in its Interim
Report on Copyright Reform, the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage expressed
frustration and disappointment at ‘‘the numerous delays
that have impeded the implementation’’ of the WCT
and WPPT, and recommended their immediate ratification. 13 Should it choose to ratify the treaties, Canada
must amend its Copyright Act to implement the provisions of the WCT and WPPT (including the provisions
requiring adequate legal protection for TPMs).
On 24 March, 2005, the Government of Canada
issued both its response to the Interim Report and a
Statement announcing its intention to table legislation
proposing copyright reforms. 14 Among other reforms,
the proposed legislation would implement the provisions of the WCT and WPPT, thus ratifying both treaties.
In comparison to the Standing Committee’s Interim
Report and its ‘‘broad-brush endorsement of extending
legal protection to TPMs’’, the Statement ‘‘recommended
what appeared to be more specific, discrete provisions’’
relating to TPMs. 15 It recommended that:
[T]he circumvention, for infringing purposes, of technological protection measures (TPMs) applied to copyright material would itself constitute an act of infringement of copyright. Copyright would also be infringed by persons who, for
infringing purposes, enable or facilitate circumvention or
who, without authorization, distribute copyright material
from which TPMs have been removed. It would not be legal
to circumvent, without authorization, a TPM applied to a
sound recording, notwithstanding the exception for private
copying. 16

The proposed legislation referred to in the Statement came to fruition in Bill C-60. Receiving its first
reading on 20 June, 2005, Bill C-60 addresses a number
of digital reforms, among them the implementation of
provisions in the WCT and WPPT pertaining to TPMs.
Bill C-60 specifically addresses TPMs in two ways. First, it
states that it is copyright infringement to circumvent, for
an infringing purpose, a TPM applied to a lesson, test, or
examination used on the premises of an educational
institution or communicated by telecommunication to
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the public situated on those premises. 17 Second, Bill
C-60 amends the civil remedies section of the Copyright
Act to entitle rights holders to all remedies that may be
conferred by law against a person who, for an infringing
purpose, circumvents, removes, or renders a TPM ineffective or provides a service to do so. 18 The provision in Bill
C-60 regarding the definition of copyright infringement
in the context of TPMs is narrower than that of the
Statement. In both Bill C-60 and the Statement, the
‘‘infringing purpose’’ approach to copyright infringement
is adopted. Through this approach, an individual
infringes copyright by circumventing a technological
measure only if the circumvention is done for an
infringing purpose. For instance, it would not be an
infringement of the Copyright Act, as amended by Bill
C-60, to circumvent a technological measure for a fair
dealing purpose.
When Parliament was dissolved on 28 November,
2005, Bill C-60 died on the order table. It is uncertain
whether the Government of Canada will reintroduce
legislation implementing the provisions of the WCT and
WPPT. As a signatory to both treaties, Canada has committed itself to their ratification. It is not bound to do so.
However, failure to ratify the WCT and WPPT could
result in Canada being ‘‘[deprived] of the benefit of reciprocal enforcement of a number of areas covered by the
treaties’’. 19 Furthermore, failure to ratify could render
Canada subject to trade-related retaliation from trading
partners. 20 Lastly, as evidenced in the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage’s Interim Report, at least
one segment of the Canadian government appears dedicated to the implementation of the WCT and WPPT.
As a result, it is anticipated that in 2006 the Canadian government will table legislation implementing the
provisions of the WCT and WPPT, specifically those
provisions instituting legal protection for TPMs. Questions remain as to what form these provisions will take:
the sweeping protections of the Interim Report; the specific and discrete protections as set out in the Statement
and Bill C-60; or stronger protections in response to
pressure from the United States of America (U.S.A.) and
other countries. 21
Any legislative action taken with respect to TPMs
must be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. In tabling Bill C-60, the Government of
Canada stated its intention to create a:
Copyright Act that addresses the Internet in a manner that
appropriately balances the rights of copyright owners to
control and benefit from the use of their creative works with
the needs of users to have reasonable access to those
works. 22

Provisions granting users a corresponding right of reasonable access to copyrighted expression protected by
TPMs, however, are noticeably absent from the Interim
Report, the Statement, and Bill C-60. In this paper, I
maintain that amending the Copyright Act to extend
legislative protection to TPMs, absent a provision
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assuring users a right of reasonable access for fair dealing
purposes, will infringe the Charter guarantee of freedom
of expression.

Part II: Fair Dealing
What is fair dealing?

T

he concept of fair dealing provides that in certain
circumstances, the unauthorized use of another’s
copyright-protected expression will not constitute copyright infringement. This defence exists in various forms
in Canada, 23 the United Kingdom (U.K.), 24 Australia, 25
and New Zealand. 26 A similar concept — termed fair use
— exists in the U.S.A. 27 In Canada, fair dealing is codified
in s. 29 of the Copyright Act. Section 29 provides that
‘‘fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study
does not infringe copyright’’. 28 Section 29.1 states that:
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Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not
infringe copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) . . . 29

As well, section 29.2 of the Copyright Act states that:
Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not
infringe copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) . . . 30

The term ‘‘fair dealing’’ is not defined in the Copyright Act. The question of whether something is ‘‘fair’’
depends on the facts of each case. 31 The Supreme Court
of Canada has set out a list of factors to provide a ‘‘useful
analytical framework [governing] determinations of fairness in future cases’’. 32 In assessing whether ‘‘fairness’’ has
been established, triers of fact should consider: (1) the
purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing;
(3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the
dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of
the dealing on the work. 33
For many years, fair dealing was ‘‘all but redundant
in the Canadian courts: rarely raised and cursorily
rejected’’. 34 However, two recent Supreme Court of
Canada decisions have indicated a shift in the Court’s
perception of the importance of fair dealing in the context of the Canadian Copyright Act. This shift has
resulted both from the Court’s recognition that the Copyright Act has as its goal the establishment of a balance
between creators and the public interest, and its
acknowledgement that fair dealing plays an integral role
in maintaining this balance.
The leading Canadian case on fair dealing is CCH
Canadian Limited. v. Law Society of Upper Canada. 35
CCH Canadian is a Canadian publisher of a variety of

legal works. The Law Society governs the legal profession
of Ontario. It maintains a reference library for its members and the judiciary that features free-standing
photocopiers. The Law Society also provides a custom
photocopying service. For a fee,
single copies of library materials required for research,
review, private study, and criticism as well as for use in
court, tribunal, and government proceedings could be provided to patrons of the library. 36

CCH alleged that the Law Society infringed their
copyright both by providing free-standing photocopiers
and through their custom photocopying service. The
Supreme Court of Canada rejected this contention,
holding that the Law Society’s dealings with the plaintiffs’ works fell under the fair dealing defence. Discussing
the nature of the defence, McLachlin C.J. stated that fair
dealing should be understood as an ‘‘integral part of the
Copyright Act ’’. 37 In a similar manner, whereas fair
dealing had been previously portrayed as a limitation on
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights, the Supreme
Court of Canada stated that:
The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain the proper
balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’
interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively. As Professor
Vaver . . . has explained . . . : ‘‘User rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should therefore be
given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial
legislation.’’ 38

In Théberge v. Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain, the
Supreme Court of Canada, in discussing the competing
goals of the Copyright Act, expanded upon the concept
of ‘‘proper balance’’:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just reward for the creator . . . The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not
only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due
weight to their limited nature. In interpreting the Copyright
Act, courts should strive to maintain an appropriate balance
between these two goals. 39

As mentioned, fair dealing plays a crucial role in helping
maintain the balance between the public interest and
creator’s rights. It does so by allowing individuals to
access, use, and build fairly upon the creator’s copyrighted expression for certain purposes. In Canada, these
purposes are those which fall within the categories of
research, private study, criticism, review, and news
reporting.

The effect of legislative protection of
TPMs on fair dealing
The equivalent of a virtual lock on digital works,
TPMs allow copyright holders to exclude unauthorized
access and use. Due to technological constraints, however, TPMs are ‘‘unable to distinguish between infringing
and non-infringing uses of digital works’’. 40 Thus, though
TPMs would have the positive effect of excluding unau-
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thorized infringing uses (such as duplication for resale),
they would also have the effect of excluding unauthorized uses which are non-infringing (such as those uses
that fall within the fair dealing defence). 41
Locked out by TPMs, individuals seeking to access
copyright-protected expression for fair dealing purposes
have three options. First, they could use a non-TPM protected copy of the work (either a print copy or a digital
copy without a TPM). Second, they could seek a licence
from the copyright holder to use the work. Third, they
could attempt to circumvent the TPM in order to access
the copyright-protected expression. The success of the
first option is dependent on the existence and accessibility of non-TPM protected copies of the work. Given
that rights owners in the digital context are increasingly
turning to the use of TPMs ‘‘to enforce and protect their
rights and to aid in the dissemination of their works’’, 42 it
is reasonable to expect that the availability of non-TPM
protected digital copies of a work will decrease. Furthermore, given the rapid spread of digital technologies, the
low cost of producing digital copies, and the ease in their
dissemination, it is reasonable to expect that the availability of print copies of a work may decrease in future
years. For instance, companies may decide to release
books through the Internet rather than in print editions.
Thus, individuals wishing to access non-TPM-protected
copies of a certain work would be forced to invest both
time and money in tracking down elusive print copies or
non-TPM-protected digital copies. Lacking these
resources, or simply unable to secure a non-TPM-protected copy, individuals would be compelled either to
seek a licence from the copyright holder or circumvent
the TPM.
The second option for individuals seeking to bypass
a TPM to access a copyright-protected work for fair
dealing purposes involves acquiring a licence for its use
from the copyright holder. However, individuals are not
legally required to seek licences for works in order to use
them for fair dealing purposes. The fair dealing defence
allows users to access and use works without first
receiving the copyright holder’s authorization. Moreover,
if the copyright holder levies a fee for its licence, then
this option would impose a cost barrier to access that
would not ordinarily exist. This cost barrier could deter
individuals who do not have the financial means to
acquire a licence. There is also a risk that some copyright
holders would refuse to licence their work at any price if
it is to be used for certain fair dealing uses (namely those
that critique the original work or place it in a less-thanflattering light). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has stated that the:
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential
licensing market. 43

Lacking financial resources or facing the copyright
holder’s refusal to licence the work, users may be forced
to actively circumvent the TPM.
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Kerr defines circumvention of a TPM as ‘‘the
breaking or avoidance of the use of a protection measure’’. 44 Both the Statement and Bill C-60 would only
impose liability if a TPM is circumvented for an
infringing purpose. Thus, under the proposed Canadian
legislation, it would be legal for users to circumvent
TPMs to exercise their user rights. However, resorting to
circumventing TPMs in order to exercise one’s user
rights has three distinct disadvantages. First, this option
imposes a technological barrier on users. As Bailey states:
[I]f exercising users’ rights means, for example, developing or
implementing decryption programs to circumvent overbroad TPMs, those without superior computer knowledge
and programming skills (i.e., most citizens) will be ‘‘locked
out’’. Most of us will be particularly dependent on those
with superior skills to develop and distribute the technology
necessary to exercise our rights. 45

Second, the act of circumventing the TPM could impose
a cost barrier on users. If users are unable to acquire
circumvention technology themselves (either through
development or discovery), they would be forced to
purchase or licence circumvention technology from programmers. Third, forcing individuals to circumvent
TPMs in order to access a work for fair dealing purposes
undermines the nature of fair dealing as a user right, as
established by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH. 46
Individuals who circumvent TPMs in order to acquire
copyright-protected expression are forced to act in a
manner suggestive of criminal behaviour. Acting in such
a manner is not compatible with the exercise of a right.
Kerr states that ‘‘circumvention of a TPM put in place by
a copyright owner to control a digital work subject to
copyright has been described by some as the electronic
equivalent of breaking and entering into a locked room
in order to obtain a copy of a work, such as a book’’. 47
Kerr highlights a variety of circumvention techniques,
many of which suggest acts of theft, including intercepting decrypted content; brute-force decryption;
stealing the key during transmission; hacking closed systems; and pirated plug- ins. 48
TPMs limit the ability of individuals to exercise
their user rights to fair dealing. Their presence could
‘‘effectively write [fair dealing] out of copyright law,
thereby creating information monopolies’’. 49 In this
paper, I maintain the position that the legislative protection of TPMs infringes the freedom of expression guarantee in s. 2(b) of the Charter. This position presupposes
that Bill C-60 may be challenged on a s. 2(b) basis. This
presupposition will be explored in the following section.

Part III: Is Copyright Legislation
Subject to Freedom of Expression
Scrutiny?

T

he issue of whether amendments to the Copyright
Act granting legislative protection to TPMs might
be challenged on the basis of freedom of expression
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requires close examination. The Copyright Act prohibits
individuals from expressing their views using the copyright-protected expression of others in ways that infringe
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. Consequently,
claimants have asserted that the Copyright Act violates
their right to freedom of expression. 50 However, arguments made on this basis have traditionally been unsuccessful, as courts have been reluctant to apply a freedom
of expression analysis to copyright laws. 51 This section
will explore the rationale underlying the courts’ reluctance in this regard. It will also demonstrate that this
rationale does not apply in the context of TPMs. This
section will show that, in the context of TPMs, it is
appropriate to apply an external freedom of expression
analysis to copyright law.
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Rationale underlying the courts’
reluctance: internal balance
The rationale underlying the courts’ reluctance to
apply freedom of expression to copyright law is the belief
that freedom of expression concerns are satisfied within
copyright law. 52 Copyright law is believed to satisfy
freedom of expression concerns through various internal
mechanisms, including the idea/expression dichotomy;
the time-limited nature of copyright; the substantial
taking requirement, and the fair dealing defence. 53 Fair
dealing is the only internal mechanism that allows users
to express themselves using a substantial amount of
unauthorized copyright-protected expression during the
period of copyright. Thus, it is the internal mechanism
most affected by TPMs. In attempting to describe the
impact of TPMs on freedom of expression, this section of
the paper will proceed by examining the relationship
between fair dealing and freedom of expression.
Courts have not expressly indicated how the fair
dealing defence protects freedom of expression concerns
within copyright law. The Supreme Court of Canada has
held that the core values underlying the protection of
freedom of expression can be summarized as follows:
(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently
good activity;
(2) participation in social and political decision-making
is to be fostered and encouraged; and
(3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment
and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an
essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those who convey a
meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it
is conveyed. 54

Fair dealing promotes these same values. It does so by
protecting certain categories of works which themselves
promote the core values of freedom of expression.
There are five categories of works within the Canadian fair dealing defence: research, private study; criticism; review; and news reporting. 55 These categories of
works promote participation in democratic dialogue, the
search for truth and communal exchange of ideas, and
self-fulfillment. By allowing individuals to reproduce
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copyrighted expression, fair dealing for the purposes of
research or private study encourages textual interaction
and personal reflection, helping individuals develop and
challenge their beliefs by weighing them against the
expressed beliefs of others. Through reproducing the
expression of others, individuals can become better
informed. Access without reproduction may not be sufficient. In some situations, individuals may not be able to
remain in close enough proximity to the original work
in order to make use of it. In other situations, the work
may be in such demand that individuals must be permitted to reproduce it in order to become better
informed. A better informed polity contributes to a rich
democracy, in which a multiplicity of views can emerge.
It can also advance the search for truth and communal
exchange of ideas. Research and private study also promote the value of self-fulfillment, in that they ‘‘[provide]
the ingredients for cultivation of knowledge, self-development and informed individual participation in a community’s affairs’’. 56 The ability to reproduce copies of
paintings, written works, and songs (among other forms
of expression) in furtherance of research or private study
purposes allows individuals to challenge themselves
intellectually, achieving self-actualization in the areas
that interest them most.
Fair dealing for the purposes of criticism, review, or
news reporting allows individuals to respond to the copyright-protected expression of others and disseminate
the results of their personal reflection with a broader
audience. It allows individuals to test the multiplicity of
views created through research and private study. By
‘‘facilitating the ventilation of divergent . . . ideas’’, the
criticism, review or reporting of copyright-protected
expression aids the democratic process. 57 Fair dealing
helps create a vibrant dialogue, which can both engage a
democratic polity in political thought and action and
advance the search for truth. In attempting to discover or
confirm ‘‘truth’’, it is essential that individuals are permitted to quote from the expression of others. Leval
notes that:
important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly referential. Philosophy, criticism, history, and even the natural sciences require continuous reexamination of yesterday’s
theses. 58

Such a reexamination would be imprecise and inefficient if individuals were not permitted to use the expression of others. For instance, a critique of the accuracy of a
historical text will be much more precise if individuals
are permitted to cite specific passages with which they
disagree.
In the ways described above, the fair dealing
defence promotes the core values of freedom of expression. In this regard, freedom of expression concerns are
addressed to some extent within the Copyright Act.
Courts seem to have relied upon the existence of fair
dealing as grounds for not applying an external freedom
of expression analysis. However, this rationale can be
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184
challenged on the grounds that the existence of a fair
dealing defence does not necessarily ensure that adequate protection is given to freedom of expression concerns.
In order to determine whether adequate protection
is given to freedom of expression concerns within copyright legislation, one must examine the scope of fair
dealing protection. The scope of fair dealing protection is
determined by the balance which is struck within copyright legislation between freedom of expression concerns
and the property interests of copyright holders. As noted
in Théberge, the Canadian Copyright Act seeks both to
promote the public interest and adequately compensate
authors. 59 This balance varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is questionable whether the Canadian conception of fair dealing balances these competing interests in
such a way as to adequately protect freedom of expression concerns. This question is especially pertinent with
respect to parody. The fair use defence in United States
jurisprudence, as it pertains to parody, is much broader
than the defence in either Canada or the U.K. A detailed
examination of this issue, however, is beyond the scope
of this paper. For the purposes of this paper, it will be
assumed that freedom of expression concerns are, for the
most part, appropriately satisfied within the Canadian
fair dealing defence.

Overcoming the courts’ reluctance to
apply an external freedom of expression
analysis
Canadian courts have not foreclosed the possibility
that freedom of expression could constrain the Copyright Act. In both The Queen v. James Lorimer & Co.
Ltd., a case involving the infringement of a literary work
entitled Canada’s Oil Monopoly, and Canadian Tire
Corp. Ltd. v. Retail Clerks Union, a case involving the
modification of the Canadian Tire logo by the Retail
Clerks Union, the courts have stated that there ‘‘may be
situations where the guarantee of freedom of expression
in para. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms may properly limit the protection otherwise
given to the owners of copyright’’. 60
While leaving open the possibility that freedom of
expression could constrain copyright, however, Canadian courts have tended to dismiss freedom of expression claims in copyright infringement cases cursorily.
Both the abridgment of the Canada’s Oil Monopoly text
and the modified Canadian Tire logo were quickly
deemed to be situations in which the infringer’s freedom
of expression was not violated. The most recent Canadian case to address the confluence between copyright
and freedom of expression, Cie Génerale des Etablissements Michelin–Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada et al.
(Michelin), does so in more detail. However, as it is open
to criticism on various grounds, it will be addressed separately, later on in the paper.
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Michelin aside, Canadian cases have not discussed
the circumstances in which courts should permit an
external application of a freedom of expression analysis
to copyright laws. 61 As a result, in order to determine
when a s. 2(b) analysis should be applied to the Copyright Act, this paper will consider decisions from other
jurisdictions. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that copyright legislation may be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny in situations where Congress has
altered the ‘‘traditional contours of copyright protection’’. 62 This principle was established in Eldred v. Ashcroft. 63 In this case, the plaintiff asked the United States
Supreme Court to declare the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA) unconstitutional. 64 The CTEA
extended the duration of copyright protection from ‘‘life
plus fifty’’ to ‘‘life plus seventy’’ years. 65 In dismissing the
case, the Supreme Court stated that in situations when
‘‘Congress has not altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny
is unnecessary’’. 66 Significantly, however, the Supreme
Court refused to adopt the position of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeal, which had stated that copyright is ‘‘categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment’’. 67 It should be noted that the Court in
Eldred does not define the ‘‘traditional contours of copyright protection’’. 68 Given the vagueness of this principle,
this decision does little to clarify the circumstances in
which a freedom of expression analysis should be
applied to copyright. 69
The UK Court of Appeal has indicated in Ashdown
v. Telegraph Group that in the majority of cases, the
‘‘express exceptions to be found in the Act’’ will satisfy
freedom of expression concerns. 70 However, in some circumstances, the ‘‘right of freedom of expression will
come into conflict with the protection afforded by the
Copyright Act ’’. The Court in Ashdown indicated that
these circumstances will be rare. However, besides the
fact that these circumstances are ‘‘rare’’, it does not tell us
when they will occur. Thus, like the approach of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Eldred, the approach of the U.K.
Court of Appeal in Ashdown gives little guidance with
respect to the question of when s. 2(b) can be applied to
challenge legislation granting protection to TPMs.
As decisions from other jurisdictions offer little guidance in this regard, this paper will attempt to set out an
approach for determining when courts can apply
freedom of expression to copyright legislation. This
approach is consistent with the courts’ rationale underlying their reluctance to apply freedom of expression in
the first instance. As stated above, courts have traditionally refrained from applying a freedom of expression
analysis to copyright because of the assumption that the
core values of freedom of expression are satisfied within
copyright law through internal mechanisms such as fair
dealing. I maintain the position that where copyright
law’s internal mechanisms are sufficient to satisfy
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freedom of expression concerns, courts should refrain
from applying a freedom of expression analysis. To do so
would be to consider freedom of expression concerns
twice. However, courts should allow the freedom of
expression guarantee to challenge the Copyright Act in
situations where the values underlying freedom of
expression are not satisfied within copyright law. 71
As stated above, the introduction of legislative provisions granting protection to TPMs effectively locks out
users seeking to use another individual’s copyright-protected expression for fair dealing purposes. Fair dealing is
effectively precluded; the protection afforded to freedom
of expression concerns within copyright law is effectively
eliminated. Consequently, the rationale for excluding an
external freedom of expression analysis is no longer
valid. Based on the approach delineated above, it is therefore appropriate to apply a s. 2(b) analysis to legislation
granting protection to TPMs.

✄ REMOVE

Username: shirley.spalding

Date: 13-DEC-06

Time: 9:20

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_03\reynolds.dat

Seq: 7

Part IV: The Constitutionality of
Legislation Granting Protection to
TPMs

I

n Part III, it was determined that amendments to the
Copyright Act granting protection to TPMs ought to
be subject to Charter scrutiny. Part IV will subject these
amendments to Charter scrutiny. In this paper, I maintain that legislation granting protection to TPMs
infringes s. 2(b) of the Charter by restricting the ability of
users to access works for fair dealing purposes. As Canada
has not yet passed legislation protecting TPMs, there are
no Canadian cases that deal with its constitutionality.
Thus, in applying s. 2(b) in the context of TPMs, this part
will begin by examining cases and commentary from
other jurisdictions in which legislation protecting TPMs
has been enacted. Informed by these works, this paper
will proceed with a s. 2(b) analysis of legislation granting
protection to TPMs.

International decisions
The European Community implemented the provisions of the WCT and WPPT in Directive 2001/29/EC
of the European Parliament (the Information Society
Directive). 72 Article 6 of this directive addresses the obligations of Member States as to technological measures. 73
Unlike the proposed amendments to the Copyright Act
contained in both the Statement and Bill C-60, the Information Society Directive (ISD) includes a provision
which protects exceptions to copyright infringement
(such as the fair dealing defence) from encroachment by
TPMs. Article 6(4) of the ISD states that:
[I]n the absence of voluntary measures taken by rightholders . . . Member states shall take appropriate measures to
ensure that right-holders make available to the beneficiary
of an exception or limitation . . . the means of benefiting
from that exception or limitation. 74
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This provision lessens the negative impact of TPMs on
user rights such as fair dealing. Given that fair dealing
protects the core values of freedom of expression,
Article 6(4) also diminishes the negative impact of TPMs
on users’ rights to freedom of expression. The existence
of this provision in the ISD demonstrates the EC’s concern with the encroachment of TPMs upon user rights. It
also highlights the potential danger to the rights of users
absent any protection for their interests in Canadian
legislation.
An illustration of how Article 6(4) protects user
rights from TPMs is found in Christophe R., UFC Que
Choisir v. Warner Music, a case decided by the Tribunal
de Grande Instance in France. 75 After buying the CD
‘‘Testify’’ by Phil Collins, Christophe R. discovered ‘‘that
he could not play it on his laptop nor could he make
copies from the CD’’. 76 Christophe R. was unable to
perform these tasks due to a TPM which was encoded
on the CD. He argued that the legislation granting protection to TPMs conflicted with his ‘‘right to private
copying’’. 77 As noted by Helberger, based on its interpretation of Article 6(4) of the ISD, the Tribunal concluded
that TPMs must ‘‘respect certain exceptions, including
the private copying exception’’. 78 In criticizing the scope
of TPMs, the Tribunal noted that:
the application of anti-copying protection devices by phonogram producers causes the statutory limitations of the
authors’ exclusive rights to authorise or prohibit reproductions to fade. 79

The Tribunal went on to state that ‘‘it is the task of the
DRM user, here: the phonogram producer, to make sure
that private copying remains possible, despite the application of technological protection measures’’. 80
It has been suggested that protection for user rights
may extend beyond that provided by Article 6(4) of the
ISD. 81 Patricia Akester indicates that the encroachment
of TPMs on user rights may also infringe a user’s freedom
of expression rights. She states that freedom of expression may be infringed where certain user rights are
denied
because rightholders fail to provide [users] with appropriate
means of doing so, especially where they fail to assure that
users are able to take advantage of exceptions that fall
within the core freedoms. 82

Akester identifies exceptions granting individuals ‘‘access
to political, artistic, literary or journalistic speech’’ as
those falling within the core freedoms, citing, as an
example, an instance where a music teacher is unable to
make a copy of a sound recording in the context of
teaching. 83
Applied in the Canadian context, Akester’s view suggests that a constitutional breach may occur where users
are denied the opportunity to take advantage of exceptions granting individuals access to political, artistic, literary, or journalistic speech. One such exception is the
fair dealing defence. Akester’s view supports the position

186

✄ REMOVE

Username: shirley.spalding

Date: 13-DEC-06

Time: 9:20

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_03\reynolds.dat

Seq: 8

of this paper that instituting legislative protection for
TPMs without providing a corresponding right of access
to users for fair dealing purposes infringes the s. 2(b)
guarantee.
The U.S.A. takes a different approach than that of
the E.C. to the legislative protection of TPMs. Enacted in
1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
implements the WCT and WPPT into United States
law. 84 It contains two provisions that address the circumvention of TPMs. Section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the DMCA
prohibits individuals from circumventing technological
measures that control access to a copyright-protected
work. 85 Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits the manufacture or
trafficking of any technology, service, or device that is
primarily designed to circumvent TPMs. 86 It is no
defence to a finding of infringement under
s. 1201(a)(1)(A) to argue that the circumvention was done
for a fair use purpose. Under the DMCA, the ‘‘downstream uses of the software . . . whether legal or illegal, are
not relevant to determining whether [one has violated]
the statute’’. 87 The DMCA differs in this regard from Bill
C-60, which, as noted above, adopts the ‘‘infringing purpose’’ approach. While it would not be an infringement
of the Copyright Act, as amended by Bill C-60, to circumvent a technological measure for a fair dealing purpose, it would be an infringement of the DMCA to
circumvent a technological measure for a fair dealing
purpose.
Though the DMCA contains no provision comparable to Article 6(4) of the ISD, some protection is offered
for users’ fair dealing rights. Section 1201(c)(1) states that
‘‘nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defences to copyright infringement, including
fair use, under this title’’. 88 It has been suggested that this
section could be used to help preserve users’ rights to
access works for fair dealing purposes under the DMCA.
In Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley , the defendants
contended that s. 1201(c)(1) ‘‘can be read to allow the
circumvention of encryption technology protecting
copyrighted material when the material will be put to
‘fair uses’ exempt from copyright liability’’. 89 This contention was rejected by Newman J. for the Court in
Corley, who stated that s. 1201(c)(1) does not permit
such a reading. Instead, Newman J. takes the position
that s. 1201(c)(1):
simply clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of
digital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking
tools) . . . [it] does not concern itself with the use of those
materials after circumvention has occurred. 90

More important for the purposes of this paper is the
position of American courts with respect to the question
of whether the burden placed on the fair use rights of
users by the DMCA constitutes a violation of users’ First
Amendment rights. This issue was addressed by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc. 91 In 321
Studios, Illston J. concluded that the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA ‘‘do not unconstitutionally
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burden the fair use rights of users of the copyright material’’. 92
321 Studios is a company that ‘‘markets and sells
software and instructions for copying DVDs’’. 93 It sells
two products that allow the user to ‘‘copy video content
from original DVDs regardless of whether they are
encoded’’ with copy control technology. 94 321 Studios
filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking, among
other relief, a declaratory judgment stating that the provisions of the DMCA that give legislative protection to
TPMs violate the First Amendment.
In her decision, Illston J. concluded that the provisions of the DMCA that deal with TPMs do not impermissibly burden the fair use rights of users. In reaching
this decision, Illston J. rejected the ‘‘plaintiff’s claim that
such users have a First Amendment right to make fair
use of copyrighted works based on Eldred v. Ashcroft ’’. 95
Illston J.’s decision can be criticized on various grounds.
First, Illston J.’s position that the burdens imposed by the
DMCA do not ‘‘unconstitutionally impinge fair use
rights’’ is based in large part on her contention that users
can access TPM-protected content in other ways sufficient for fair use purposes. As Illston J. states, ‘‘fair use is
still possible under the DMCA, although such copying
will not be as easy, as exact, or as digitally manipulable as
plaintiff desires’’. 96 This paper takes the position that this
contention is not always valid. Illston J. cites the analysis
in Corley in support of her position, in which the court
states that:
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as
protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution,
guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the original . . . The fact that the resulting
copy will not be as perfect or as manipulable as a digital
copy obtained by having direct access to the DVD movie in
its digital form, provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use. 97

The content in question may not be available in any
form other than that protected by the technological
measure. Illston J. herself acknowledges that ‘‘not all content on DVDs may be available in other forms’’. 98 As a
result, users could be forced into a position where they
must either circumvent the technological measure or
take alternate measures to use the TPM-protected content. The nature of such alternate measures, and their
level of effectiveness, varies depending on the medium
and the level of technological protection. For instance, if
the sole copy of a photograph is contained on a DVD
protected by a technological measure, the critic seeking
to use the photograph for a fair dealing purpose, if constrained from accessing the photograph through circumvention of the technological measure, may have to use a
camera to take a picture of the photograph as it is displayed on a computer monitor. Such a picture would, in
all probability, be of lower quality than the original, and
may be of such poor quality that the fair use purpose is
frustrated. Given the varying efficacy of alternate measures, another court may deem that, contrary to the posi-
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tion of Illston J., the alternate methods through which
users can access TPM-protected content are not sufficient
for fair use purposes.
Second, Illston J. conflates different forms of content in order to support her argument that users can,
without much difficulty, find ways to make fair use of
the content without having to circumvent a technological measure. In building her argument, Illston J. uses a
quote from United States v. Elcom Ltd., in which the
court stated that ‘‘the fair user may find it more difficult
to engage in certain fair uses with regard to electronic
books, but nevertheless, fair use is still available’’. 99 In this
situation, the user, constrained by a technological measure (for instance a read-only copy of a text), is denied
the ability to digitally copy and paste large swathes of
text for a fair use purpose. However, the user can,
without much difficulty, write out the text by hand or
work with a second computer to type out the text. In the
example given in Elcom , fair use is made more difficult
by technological measures. Nevertheless, the user is still
able to access and copy the work relatively easily,
without a loss of quality. As a result, the balance of
convenience may fall on the side of the copyright owner,
which could justify the presence of the anti-circumvention provisions. Illston J.’s argument becomes much
more tenuous when one envisions the content in question as film or photographs, rather than text. In film, the
dialogue can be copied by hand without much difficulty.
Copying a video without access to the DVD itself, however, is much more difficult. One option could be for the
user to use a personal video recorder to film the content
required for the fair use purpose as it appears on the
screen (in view-only format). However, the quality of this
recording could be very poor. Similar problems are
posed by photography, as noted above. In dealing with
film and photography, the balance of convenience may
fall on the side of the user seeking to exercise their fair
dealing rights, as opposed to the copyright owner. Illston
J. does not address the difficulties posed by video and
film, despite the fact that 321 Studios is a case which
deals with the copying of DVDs and not electronic
books.
Third, Illston J. minimizes the difficulties noted
above through her choice of diction. Through the course
of the decision, Illston J. uses phrases that create the
impression that users who are denied the opportunity to
circumvent technological measures to access protected
content for fair dealing purposes experience only a small
inconvenience. In reality, their fair use purpose may be
completely frustrated. Illston J. cites a passage in Corley
which states that ‘‘the fact that the resulting copy will not
be as perfect or as manipulable as a digital copy . . .
provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use’’. 100 In addition, Illston J. states that ‘‘fair
use is still possible under the DMCA, although such
copying will not be as easy, as exact, or as digitally
manipulable as plaintiff desires’’. 101 The use of the words
‘‘optimum’’, ‘‘identical’’, ‘‘perfect’’, ‘‘easy’’, and ‘‘desires’’ (as

opposed to requires) give the reader the impression that
the user, though slightly inconvenienced, is still able to
accomplish his or her fair dealing purpose. Furthermore,
the use of the word ‘‘desires’’ (as opposed to requires)
could give the reader the impression that the user is an
individual who chooses to use the technologically-protected content, and not one who needs the content
locked up by the technological measure for a fair use
purpose. While the fact that the resulting copy will not
be as perfect as a digital copy may provide no basis for a
claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use, the fact
that the resulting copy may be so shoddy as to be
unusable for a fair use purpose may provide a basis for a
claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use. In such a
case, fair use may not be deemed to be ‘‘available’’, as
TPM-imposed barriers may effectively preclude users
from exercising their right to fair dealing. In this situation, Eldred may mandate the application of the First
Amendment to the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA, as copyright’s built-in safeguards may not be
adequate to resolve First Amendment concerns. 102
Fourth, Illston J.’s judgment, by minimizing the
impact of the burden placed on the fair dealing rights of
users, adopts a restrictive view of fair use and users’ rights.
This restrictive view is inconsistent with the approach
taken in American jurisprudence, as illustrated by the
broad view of fair use taken in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
by the United States Supreme Court. 103 Similarly, Illston
J.’s restrictive view of fair use is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in CCH Canadian,
in which fair dealing was characterized broadly as a
user’s right. 104 Given these possible criticisms of Illston J.’s
decision, this paper takes the position that further judicial support for Illston J.’s position is needed if it is to
influence the development of Canadian law in this area.

Canada
Section 2(b) analysis
Informed by cases and commentary from the E.C.
and the U.S.A., this paper will proceed by subjecting
legislation protecting TPMs to a s. 2(b) analysis. As noted
in Part I, Bill C-60 died when the Parliament of Canada
was dissolved. The form which future Canadian legislation protecting TPMs will take is uncertain. As a result,
the ‘‘legislation’’ which this paper will subject to a s. 2(b)
analysis will consist of an amalgam of the Statement and
Bill C-60. The Statement reflects the Government of
Canada’s broad vision for the statute; Bill C-60 reflects
the first attempt to enact such a statute. Consistent with
the Statement and Bill C-60, the legislation for the purposes of the s. 2(b) analysis will contain a provision
stating that the circumvention, for infringing purposes, of
TPMs applied to copyright material will itself constitute
an act of infringement of copyright. 105 Furthermore, also
consistent with the Statement and Bill C-60, the legislation being subjected to s. 2(b) scrutiny will not contain a
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provision granting users a right to access TPM-protected
expression for fair dealing purposes.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that a
s. 2(b) claim proceeds in two steps. First, it must be
determined whether the defendant’s activity is within
the sphere of conduct protected by freedom of expression. This step asks both whether the activity can be
considered ‘‘expression’’ and whether there are any special circumstances that warrant removing that activity
from the protected sphere of freedom of expression.
Second, it must be determined whether the government
action in question restricts this activity in purpose or
effect. 106
The first stage of the s. 2(b) analysis requires that we
determine whether the defendant’s activities constitute
‘‘expression’’. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated
that an activity is expressive if it attempts to convey
meaning. 107 This definition is ‘‘very broad and inclusive’’
and should be given a ‘‘generous interpretation’’. 108
Given the courts’ generous interpretation of ‘‘expression’’, fair dealing activities will likely be considered
‘‘expression’’ for the purpose of the freedom of expression analysis. Criticism, review, and news reporting generally fuse the expression of the user/author with that of
the copyright holder in the attempt to convey meaning
to a broader audience. In research and private study, one
generally attempts to convey meaning to oneself through
a process of investigation and analysis.
Next, it must be determined whether there are any
‘‘special circumstances that would warrant removing
[activities falling within the fair dealing defence] from
the protected sphere under the Charter ’’. 109 For example,
violent forms of expression fall outside of the protected
sphere under s. 2(b). 110 However, ‘‘a form need not be
violent in order to be prohibited’’. 111 In Cie Génerale des
Etablissements Michelin–Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.Canada (Michelin), Teitelbaum J. of the Federal Court
Trial Division held that acts that involve the use of
another individual’s intellectual property are prima facie
prohibited forms of expression. Acts will be protected
where the user can demonstrate that they are consistent
with the function of the property.
In Michelin, the defendant CAW created leaflets
which featured the plaintiff’s smiling character
‘‘Bibendum’’ (a ‘‘fanciful, happy, marshmallow-like figure
. . . attired not unlike an astronaut, but with an exposed
cartoon-style of head’’) with its foot raised menacingly
over an unsuspecting worker. 112 These leaflets were created in furtherance of the defendants’ attempts to
‘‘become the bargaining agents for the workforce at three
plants of the plaintiff in Nova Scotia’’. 113 The Bibendum
was protected under both copyright and trade mark law.
The plaintiff sued under both heads. As part of their
defence, CAW claimed that certain provisions in the
Copyright Act infringed their Charter right to freedom
of expression. 114
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Teitelbaum J. concluded that ‘‘the Charter does not
confer the right to use private property — the Plaintiff’s
copyright — in the service of freedom of expression’’. 115
He expanded upon this statement by noting that:
[A] person using the private property of another like a copyright, must demonstrate that his or her use of the property is
compatible with the function of the property before the
Court can deem the use a protected form of expression
under the Charter. 116

If the defendant cannot demonstrate this compatibility,
then the activity will be deemed a prohibited form of
expression. Applying this test to the parodic depiction,
Teitelbaum J. noted that:
In the present case, subjecting the Plaintiff’s ‘‘Bibendum’’ to
ridicule as the object of parody is not compatible with the
function of the copyright. A ‘‘Bibendum’’ about to stomp
hapless workers into submission does not present the original author’s intent of a favourable corporate image or provide an incentive for compensating artists for the integrity of
their vision. 117

Accordingly, Teitelbaum J. concluded that the parodic
depiction of ‘‘Bibendum’’ was a prohibited form of
expression, and was not protected under the sphere of
s. 2(b). 118
The Michelin approach to the s. 2(b) analysis
requires users seeking Charter protection for works
falling under the fair dealing defence to demonstrate
that their use of the property is compatible with the
function of the property before their use can be deemed
a protected form of expression. Teitelbaum J. defines the
‘‘function’’ of the property according to the author’s
interests. In Michelin, he held that the two functions of
the ‘‘Bibendum’’ were to ‘‘present the original author’s
intent of a favourable corporate image or provide an
incentive for compensating artists for the integrity of
their vision’’. 119
Under this approach, many acts of fair dealing
would fall outside the scope of s. 2(b) protection. For
instance, acts of fair dealing that are critical of the works
from which the underlying copyright-protected expression is drawn would be denied protection on the basis
that they neither present the original author’s intent of a
favourable image, nor provide incentives for compensating authors. It is likely that even if the parodic depiction of ‘‘Bibendum’’ had met the criteria for ‘‘criticism’’
in the Copyright Act, it would have been denied protection on the grounds that it presented an unfavourable
image of the corporation, contrary to the intent of the
original author. Significantly, fair dealing acts which are
critical of the copyright holder (in this case, a corporation) promote the core values of democratic dialogue
and the search for truth. To deny these forms of fair
dealing protection under the freedom of expression
guarantee is to impoverish the guarantee itself.

Michelin’s approach can be criticized on various
grounds. First, Teitelbaum J.’s analysis in Michelin ‘‘subverts the principle of constitutional supremacy articu-
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lated in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 ’’. 120
While there is a constitutional right to freedom of
expression, there is no constitutional right to property. As
noted by Bailey, ‘‘the existence of any . . . property right is
dependent on the constitutional validity of the legislation purporting to grant it’’. 121 Compelling users to
demonstrate the compatibility of their expression with
the intention of the copyright holder ‘‘mistakenly places
the statutory property cart before the constitutional
expression horse’’. 122
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In addition, Teitelbaum J.’s decision improperly balances the constitutionally protected right to freedom of
expression of users with the unentrenched property
rights of copyright holders. Though neither freedom of
expression nor intellectual property rights are absolute,
any balancing that takes place between the two must
occur at the stage of a s. 1 analysis. 123 As Bailey notes,
‘‘there is no principled basis to suggest that economic
rights should foreclose inclusion of expression within the
scope of section 2(b)’’. 124

Fourth, Teitelbaum J.’s approach is implicitly
rejected in British Columbia Automobile Assn v. Office
and Professional Employees’ International Union, Local
378 (BCAA). 130 BCAA dealt with a labour dispute in
which the Union ‘‘created a web site which was similar
to the Association’s web site in appearance and used the
Association’s trade-marks in its domain name and meta
tags’’. 131 The plaintiff contended that ‘‘the right of
freedom of expression . . . cannot provide justification for
appropriating or infringing the plaintiff’s intellectual
property rights’’. 132 This position echoes Teitelbaum J.’s
decision. Sigurdson J., however, rejects the plaintiff’s
claim that the right of freedom of expression cannot
provide justification for appropriating or infringing the
plaintiff’s intellectual property rights. Instead, Sigurdson
J. holds that in determining whether the right of
freedom of expression can justify the appropriation of
another’s intellectual property, it is necessary to strike a
reasonable balance between the property rights of the
owner and the freedom of expression rights of the
user. 133

Second, Teitelbaum J.’s characterization of the
objective of the Copyright Act is singularly concerned
with the rights of the copyright holder. For instance,
Teitelbaum J. states that the objective of the Copyright
Act is the ‘‘protection of authors and ensuring that they
are recompensed for their creative energies and works’’.
This statement is inconsistent with the Supreme Court
of Canada’s characterization of the objective of the Copyright Act as attempting to create a ‘‘balance between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just reward for the creator’’. 125 Rather than
existing as a near-absolute right, as presented by Teitelbaum J., creator’s rights are of a ‘‘limited nature’’. 126

It is important to note that in his decision,
Sigurdson J. did not refer to the aspects of the Michelin
decision that address the intersection of copyright and
freedom of expression. However, Sigurdson J. does discuss Michelin in the context of the ‘‘ambit of ‘use’ of
marks in association with wares or services under Section 20 and Section 22 of the Trade-marks Act ’’. 134 This
indicates that Sigurdson J. was aware of the Michelin
decision. In establishing his own ‘‘balancing rights’’
approach, Sigurdson J. implicitly rejects Teitelbaum J.’s
view that the appropriation of another individual’s intellectual property should be deemed a prohibited form of
form of expression unless it can be demonstrated that
the use of the property is compatible with its function.

Third, Teitelbaum J.’s analysis is flawed in that it
collapses the distinction between real property and intellectual property. Teitelbaum J. does so by applying principles derived from real property cases to intellectual
property issues. For instance, in discussing whether the
copyright-protected expression of another can be used in
the service of expression, Teitelbaum J. cites a real property case which concluded that ‘‘any person who trespasses upon . . . the property of another . . . is guilty of an
offence’’. 127 The conceptual distinction between tangible
and intangible property is mentioned only briefly during
the course of the decision. In discussing the nature of
copyright as private property, Teitelbaum J. notes that it
is an intangible property right. However, instead of
taking this opportunity to address the distinctions
between tangible and intangible property (namely that
the copyright owner does not possess the ‘‘absolute
power of a private (real) property owner to control access
to and use of public intellectual property’’ 128), Teitelbaum J. dismisses the distinctions by stating that ‘‘just
because the right is intangible, it should not be any less
worthy of protection as a full property right’’. 129

Fifth, other jurisdictions have not excluded acts
from the protected sphere of freedom of expression on
the basis that they involved the use of another individual’s copyright-protected expression. In Laugh it Off
Promotions (LIO) v. South African Breweries International (SAB), the Constitutional Court of South Africa
dealt with a case involving the interrelationship between
the freedom of expression guarantee contained in section 16(1) of the Constitution and the protection of registered trade marks in s. 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act
194 of 1993 (an anti-dilution provision). 135 SAB had
brought an action against LIO to enjoin LIO from using
its trade mark in making t-shirts displaying a message of
‘‘social satire or parody’’. 136 Affirming the importance of
freedom of expression, the Constitutional Court held
that the anti-dilution provision
must be construed in the light of the Constitution and
applied in a manner that does not unduly trample upon
freedom of expression. This approach would necessitate the
weighing-up of the constitutional safeguard of free expression of the unauthorised user against the right to intellectual
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property of the trade mark owner and where appropriate
the owner’s freedoms of trade, occupation or profession. 137

A similar balancing was carried out in the U.S.A. in
Cardtoons , L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association between freedom of expression and the right of
publicity. 138 In Cardtoons, an action was brought to
obtain a
declaratory judgment that [Cardtoons] parody trading cards
featuring active major league baseball players do not
infringe on the publicity rights of the members of the Major
League Baseball Players Association. 139

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated
that ‘‘like trademark and copyright, the right of publicity
involves a cognizable property interest’’. 140 However, as
the right of publicity does not have any ‘‘built-in mechanisms that serve to avoid First Amendment concerns’’,
the right had to be balanced directly with the free speech
guarantee. 141
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Sixth, Teitelbaum J.’s conclusion that acts that
involve the use of another individual’s intellectual property are prima facie prohibited forms of expression is
inconsistent with the broad approach taken by the
Supreme Court of Canada in determining whether acts
constitute protected forms of expression. As noted in R.
v. Keegstra:
Apart from rare cases where expression is communicated in
a physically violent form, the Court thus viewed the fundamental nature of the freedom of expression as ensuring that
‘‘if the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it
has expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope
of the guarantee’’. 142

Guided by this broad and generous interpretation of
freedom of expression, the Supreme Court of Canada
has found that deliberate lies and falsehoods, 143 defamatory libel, 144 and possession of child pornography 145 are
all protected forms of expression under s. 2(b). The
breadth of these decisions suggest that fair dealing
should constitute a protected form of expression. Given
the above stated deficiencies, this paper takes the position that Michelin is unpersuasive and should not be
followed. Accordingly, contrary to the approach in
Michelin, activities falling under the fair dealing defence
should not be excluded from s. 2(b) protection on the
basis that they contain the copyright-protected expression of another individual.
Having determined that the acts in question constitute expression and that there are no special circumstances which warrant removing that expression from
the protected sphere under the Charter, the next step in
the freedom of expression analysis asks whether the purpose or effect of the government action in question is to
restrict freedom of expression. 146 The assessment of legislative purpose focuses upon the aims and objectives of
the legislature. 147 If the government’s purpose was to
restrict attempts to convey a meaning, there has been a
limitation of s. 2(b) and a s. 1 analysis is required. 148
The purpose of the provisions granting legislative
protection to TPMs is to restrict attempts to convey
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meaning. The government’s main objective in tabling
legislation granting protection to TPMs is to implement
the provisions of the WCT and WPPT, including those
provisions that address TPMs. 149 TPMs seek to preclude
infringing uses of copyright-protected expression, many
of which attempt to convey meaning. One such example
is the parodic depiction of ‘‘Bibendum’’ in Michelin.
Thus, because the purpose of the provisions is to restrict
meaning, a s. 2(b) violation is established.
Though a determination that the purpose of the
provisions unconstitutionally restricts freedom of expression is dispositive of the matter, this paper will, for the
sake of completeness, investigate whether the effects of
the government action restrict expression. In order to
determine whether the provisions granting legislative
protection to TPMs restrict the claimant’s freedom of
expression in effect, the claimant must investigate
whether the expressive activity at issue promoted at least
one of the three core values of freedom of expression. 150
In the case at hand, the ‘‘expressive activities’’ at issue are
those activities that fall within the fair dealing defence.
These activities, as noted earlier, promote the core values
of freedom of expression. By restricting the fair dealing
defence, the provisions of Bill C-60 infringe the s. 2(b)
guarantee in effect.
Section 1 analysis
Section 1 of the Charter states that the rights and
freedoms set out in the Charter are guaranteed ‘‘only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society’’. 151 In order to justify the infringement of the
freedom of expression guarantee, the government must
demonstrate that the law meets the s. 1 test as set out in
R. v. Oakes. 152 There are four parts to the Oakes test.
First, it is asked whether the objective served by the
measures limiting a Charter right is sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected
right or freedom. 153 The objective of the provisions concerning the protection of TPMs is to implement international treaties that seek to protect authors against the
unauthorized use of their works. The ease with which
dissemination occurs on the Internet renders the need to
protect authors’ content pressing and substantial. This
objective would likely qualify as sufficiently important
because it helps ensure authors are compensated for
their efforts. Absent protection for authors, the financial
incentive to create diminishes, threatening a society’s creative output and the future of industries associated with
copyright.
Second, it must be demonstrated that the
impugned measures are rationally connected to the
objective. 154 As noted above, the objective of the provisions concerning the protection of TPMs is to implement international treaties that seek to protect authors
against the unauthorized use of their works. The mea-

sures enacted, granting legislative protection to TPMs,
seek to carry out these objectives.
Third, the means should impair the Charter right
no more than necessary to accomplish the objective. 155
The impugned provisions in the Statement and Bill C-60
are intended to restrict only infringing unauthorized
uses. The effect of the provisions is much broader. The
provisions restrict all activities that use the expression of
another to convey meaning. Consequently, the provisions granting protection to TPMs are overbroad, and
thus not the least drastic means of pursuing the objective. On this basis, the provisions granting legislative protection to TPMs cannot be justified. In the interest of
completeness, this paper will investigate the fourth
branch of the Oakes test.
Fourth, there must be proportionality between the
effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting
the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which
has been identified as of ‘‘sufficient importance’’. 156 The
impact of the impugned provisions on the user is
profound. TPMs lock individuals out from copyrightprotected expression, effectively preventing them from
exercising their fair dealing rights. As discussed in Part II,
the denial of fair dealing rights impoverishes the core
values of freedom of expression, namely participation in
democratic dialogue, the search for truth, and self-fulfillment. The objective of protecting authors would not, in
all probability, outweigh the deleterious effects to users’
freedom of expression rights. Thus, the effects of the
impugned provisions are disproportionate to the objective.

The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada,
and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no
force or effect. 157

At this point, the legislature may either abandon the
legislation or rewrite the impugned provisions in a
manner consistent with the Charter . A possible
‘‘rewriting’’ of the impugned provisions is discussed in
Part V.
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Remedy
The legislative protection of TPMs infringes the
right to freedom of expression guaranteed in s. 2(b) of
the Charter, and cannot be justified through a s. 1 analysis. Thus, the legislation is inconsistent with the Charter.
Subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 states
that:
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Part V: Treaty Implications

G

iven the discussion in Part I regarding the consequences of Canada’s failure to implement the
WCT and WPPT and its commitment to do so, it is
doubtful that the Canadian government will choose to
abandon its goal of implementing legislation protecting
TPMs. As a result, it is likely that Canada will reintroduce
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copyright legislation implementing the WCT and
WPPT. It must do so in a manner consistent with the
Charter. The impugned provisions failed Charter scrutiny in part because they had the effect of restricting the
core values of freedom of expression. In order for future
legislation regarding TPMs to survive Charter scrutiny,
the core values of freedom of expression must be protected. This paper takes the position that in order to
survive Charter scrutiny, legislation granting protection
to TPMs must contain a provision requiring copyright
holders who institute TPMs to provide access to users for
fair dealing purposes. Article 6(4) of the ISD may act as a
potential model for future legislation.
The addition of such a provision (the fair dealing
amendment), however, might cause the legislative
scheme to violate Article 11 of the WCT and Article 18
of the WPPT. 158 Articles 11 and 18 require contracting
parties to provide ‘‘adequate legal protection’’ for
TPMs. 159 The fair dealing amendment would allow individuals seeking to access a work for infringing purposes
to do so unimpeded through misuse of the fair dealing
exception. Thus, the fair dealing amendment may render
TPMs ineffective, and Canada’s legal protection for TPMs
inadequate. The predicament that arises should Canada
choose to ratify the WCT and WPPT is two-fold. If
Canada does not implement the fair dealing amendment, then, based on the above analysis, it will violate
the freedom of expression rights of its citizens. If Canada
does implement the fair dealing amendment, it may be
found to be in violation of Articles 11 and 18 of the
WCT and WPPT.
However, the likelihood that the fair dealing
amendment would violate Articles 11 and 18 must be
examined in more detail. Under the WCT and WPPT,
contracting parties need not provide protection against
the circumvention of all TPMs. Articles 11 and 18
require contracting parties only to provide ‘‘adequate
legal protection’’ against the circumvention of TPMs
used by authors/performers in connection with the exercise of their rights under the WCT, WPPT or the Berne
Convention, and that restrict acts which are not authorized or permitted by law. 160 The reach of TPMs currently
extends far beyond this limited scope. As noted above,
one of the main criticisms of TPMs is that they are not
technologically sophisticated enough to distinguish
infringing uses from non-infringing uses. 161 They restrict
both acts prohibited by law and those permitted by law.
Furthermore, TPMs are currently used by authors to protect both existing rights and rights which do not exist
under copyright legislation, such as an exclusive right to
control access to a work. It is assumed that if WIPO had
intended to require contracting parties to provide protection for all TPMs, then it would have drafted Articles 11
and 18 to reflect this intention. The presence of limitations in Articles 11 and 18 indicates that WIPO wished
the protection of TPMs to operate within these restraints.
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Thus, even if the effect of altering legislation protecting TPMs to include a right to access TPM-protected
works for fair dealing purposes causes the legal protection of TPMs in Canada to become inadequate, it would
not breach the WCT or WPPT. Rather, the addition of a
right to access TPM-protected works for fair dealing purposes would merely help bring what are now overreaching technological mechanisms closer into conformity with the standards as set out in the WCT and
WPPT. The threat of breaching treaty obligations should
not deter the Canadian government from including a
provision guaranteeing access to TPM-protected expression for fair dealing purposes in any legislation granting
protection to TPMs.
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TPMs impoverish the core values of freedom of expression. In order for legislation implementing TPMs to survive Charter scrutiny, it must contain a provision
requiring copyright holders who institute TPMs to provide access to users for fair dealing purposes. Such a
provision, though it may render TPMs ineffective, would
not cause Canada to breach its treaty obligations. In
sanctioning TPMs without providing a right for users to
access copyright-protected works for fair dealing purposes, the Canadian government is sanctioning the
impoverishment of democratic dialogue, the search for
truth, and self-fulfillment, ‘‘principle[s] of vital importance in a free and democratic society’’. 162 As Iacobucci J.
noted in Irwin Toy:
Our concern should be to recognize that in this century we
have seen whole societies utterly corrupted by the suppression of free expression. We should not lightly take a step in
that direction, even a small one. 163

Conclusion

T
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his paper takes the position that the legislative protection of TPMs infringes the s. 2(b) guarantee of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
cannot be justified through a s. 1 analysis. TPMs preclude
users from exercising their right to fair dealing. Fair
dealing promotes and protects the core values of
freedom of expression in the copyright context. By precluding users from exercising their right to fair dealing,

The enactment of legislative protection for TPMs, absent
a corresponding right of access for users to exercise their
right to fair dealing, leads to the suppression of free
expression. In attempting to respond to the challenges
posed by digital technologies to the exclusive rights of
copyright holders, the Canadian government must not
take a step in this direction.
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